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ABSTRACT 
Improvement of Security in UAS Communication and Navigation using ADS-B 
 
By 
 
Vedadatta Gouripeddi 
 
Dr. Yoohwan Kim, Examination Committee Chair 
 
Associate Professor, Department of Computer Science 
 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 
 
 
In this thesis, we congregate the security threats on UAS and suggest solutions using 
ADS-B device. UAS ground and intercommunication is prone to availability, confidentiality and 
integrity attacks. UAS communication has three layered wireless Ad-Hock network which 
comprises of Complex group key exchange. Loss of one layer in the Ad-hock network leads to a 
complete loss of communication in the network. Current UAS navigation methods include 
complete reliance on onboard sensors, radars and GPS. This research proposes solutions for UAS 
communication, navigation and collision avoidance using ADS-B. ADS-B acts as a back-up 
when there is a loss in any one of the trees layers in an Ad-Hock network. Integration of ADS-B 
along with onboard sensors gives an accurate and precise location of the UAS. ADS-B also helps 
in neighbor discovery which prevents collisions in small UAS. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
An Unmanned aerial system (UAS) is an autonomous air vehicle which does not have any 
crew on board. Unmanned Aerial systems are also called as drones.  One of the most common 
type of UAS is the remotely piloted air vehicle (RPV).  UAS was designed to fly in locations 
where a manned aircraft would be prone to risk of attacks and a pose a threat to human life. UAS 
were in use as early as the late 1850’s. The first air vehicle was built using a large gas balloon for 
combat purposes. Developments and research to use UAS for military purposes has taken a 
strong hold during the World War 1 and World War 2.  
In the recent years and a lot of research and investment has been put into drone development 
and its research. Drones have proved that they are very useful not only in the war fields but also 
in our day to day activities. Per global market estimates top companies manufacturing consumer 
drones have seen an average increase of 32% growth rate annually. Figure 2 shows the demand 
for commercial consumer drones. FAA has registered three hundred thousand consumer drones in 
January 2016 and predicts that approximately 50% of the drones are not yet registered.  By 2020 
usage of consumer drone predictions are sky rocketing. 
 Types of UAS 
Classification of UAS can be done based on size and range. Classifications based on size are 
very small, small, medium and large UAS. Very small and small UAS systems are the most 
commonly bought for civil purposes [1]. Medium and large are used for military purposes. 
Classification based on range are low cost, range and endurance. High endurance UAS are 
currently being used as orbital UAS. Orbital UAS are proposed to be the next generation satellites. 
Orbital UAS fly with the help of solar energy for longer endurance or range. Some of the 
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classifications based on altitude parameter and speed are Medium Altitude Long Range (MALE), 
and High Altitude Long Range (HALE). Classification of UAS are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Classification of UAS 
 
Figure 2: Sales prediction of consumer drones.  
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 UAS Applications  
UAS can be used different purposes including civil and military (combat efficient). The most 
common use of UAS is for surveillance. Surveillance UAS carry advanced equipment such as high 
resolution video surveillance camera. In addition to capturing surveillance images, UAS cameras 
help in route planning and terrain detection by leveraging inbuilt vision system both in 2D and 3D. 
Advancements not only in the technical and software aspects of the UAS but also in the mechanical 
construction of the UAS has played a major role in broadening their use in recent years. 
Improvements in mechanical components, electrical motors, artificial intelligence, endurance life, 
maneuverability, and ease of use have resulted in mass production of UAS for civilian purposes. 
Solar panels are also being deployed to supplement battery power and improve the endurance of 
UAS. 
Applications UAS is widely used are security, search and rescue, monitoring, disaster 
management, crop management, communications and survey[2]. Recently introduced into 
Oceanography, photography and environmental. UAS has proved to be very beneficial in 
environmental purposes. Some of the environmental purposes are assessing and monitoring 
pollution, air quality detection, wildlife monitoring and behavioral research, forest monitoring, 
volcano monitoring, avalanche monitoring etc.  Future inventions and research is in the areas of 
detecting and disabling bombs, identification of hostage situations and distribution of medical 
supplies in emergency situations[3]. 
 Motivation 
UAS is going to play an important role in the future. Applications are going to become more 
and more dependent on UAS systems. Already some of the sectors like agriculture, wildlife 
monitoring, weather tracking and security surveillance have started depending on UAS. Ease of 
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operation and low cost maintenance has pushed for a shift from traditional small manned 
aircrafts to autonomous UAS. Although, there is such a high demand for UAS, full-fledged 
implementation of the UAS into the National Air Space(NAS) is not possible at least till 2020. 
Autonomous UAS depend on GPS and other sensors for location identification whereas small 
UAS use line of sight flight control by using Wi-Fi and low powered networks. Either ways, be it 
autonomous or line of sight UAS depend on very vulnerable networks which are very easy for 
attacks. Jamming, spoofing eavesdropping are just some of the many security threats possible on 
UAS.  
To avoid different kinds of security threats that are possible on UAS, fusion and dependency 
on many sensors is recommended. ADS-B is a surveillance device used to track aircrafts. 
Implementation of ADS-B into UAS can make a significant difference in improvement of 
security in UAS. ADS-B also has security issues as perfect security solutions for ADS-B are yet 
to be proposed. The combination of GPS sensors and ADS-B can provide accurate positional 
information of the UAS. Integration of ADS-B into UAS can improve clarity in communication 
and accuracy in navigation.  
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CHAPTER 2: SECURITY IN UAS COMMUNICATION 
The communication in UAS happens typically in three distinct ways – UASs 
communication with ground control station (GCS), UAS communication with Air traffic control 
(ATC), and Intercommunication between UAVs. The schematic in Figure 3 shows three types of 
communications in UAS.  
 
Figure 3: Schematic of UAS Communication 
 Communication between UAS and Ground control station (GCS)  
Ground control station is a work station from where human can control a UAS. Ground 
control stations are mostly located on land or sea to control drones within or in the atmosphere. 
GCS provides necessary capability for operations at different levels. Important motives of GCS 
are to provide communication, display flight path and mission planning. GCS has a human 
operating a variety of devices that can establish communication with the UAS. Some of the 
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devices that can be used to establish communication are radio transmitter/receiver, smart phone, 
a computer and a Control center mostly used for military purposes. Recently developed 
advancements are small UAS can be controlled by hand held wearable devices. GCS may be 
divided into two types local and High Quality (HQ). Generally, HQ GCS might be located at 
some military operated agency, while local is located at any suitable ground location. Local GCS 
also include portable GCS. Portable GCS are nothing but laptops, tablets and phones. The 
communication between a GCS and a UAS would be a Line of Sight(LOS) radio based 
communication or GPRS. Local GCS is more vulnerable to threats than HQ GCS because 
security measures are already in place for HQ [4]. The basic functions of a GCS are to establish 
mission planning, flight control or maneuver of a UAS and information transfer.  
GCS in the recent years with advancement in technology, a single GCS is being used to 
control more than one UAS at the same time. GCS set up can be divided into two parts internal 
and the external as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. In the internal part of the GCS has control of 
the UAS, display, pilot box, UAS flight data, planning and analysis, flight information broadcast 
and video and audio transmission information. The external part of the GCS consists of wireless 
communications and wired communications with external interfaces as shown in the table 1.
 
Figure 4: Inside a Ground Control Station. 
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Table 1: GCS Interfaces. 
Position GCS equipment 
Internal Flight Control and Information 
Display Screen for Control and Vehicle status 
Pilot Box 
UAS Flight Data  
Planning and Analysis 
Audio and Video Transmission Display Panels 
External  Equipment for Wireless Communication  
Equipment for Wired Communication 
 
 
Figure 5: Communication pattern and interface of GCS. 
Security in UAS-to-GCS communication is characterized by three different parameters that 
are described as follows:  
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2.1.1. Availability  
When ground radio transmitter/receiver and air-borne radio transmitter/receiver are in good 
working condition despite the adverse effects such as rain, foliage, jamming and airframe 
blockage, then the UAS communication is said to be effectively available. Availability attacks are 
generally jamming, falsifying signals and denial of service(DOS) [4]. 
2.1.2. Confidentiality 
These attacks generally deal with unauthorized access to information. The easiest way to 
compromise the information is by intercepting the information. Confidentiality threats to GCS are 
mostly computer based i.e. malwares, Trojan and key loggers. Basic unintentional human errors 
also come into account. Confidentiality is inversely proportional to continuity. Continuity is 
defined as uninterrupted packet delivery during communication between UAS and the GCS [4].  
2.1.3. Integrity 
Integrity attacks are defined on two basics one, if the existing data is being modified or when 
data is being fabricated [4].Integrity is a measure of undetected errors in the message over a 
defined span of time. The greater the number of undetected errors, the lesser the value of 
integrity.  
 Communication between UAS and air traffic control center (ATC)  
ATC is responsible for communicating with the UAS and providing it with the information on 
landing clearances, route path, meteorological information etc. It also broadcasts positioning, 
altitude and velocity information among the UASs and other aerial vehicles in vicinity. The ATC’s 
transponder transmits various tele commands to the UAS autopilot and receives telemetry data 
from the autopilot. Some of the commonly used tele commands are ADS-B, Automatic Dependent 
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Surveillance-Rebroadcast (ADS-R), Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Contract(ADS-C), First 
Information Service-Broadcast (FIS-B), Traffic Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B) etc.  
 UAS Intercommunication  
UAS Intercommunication is the communication between different UAS flying in the same 
vicinity which share each other’s flight information. UAS intercommunication is used in both 
civilian and military purposes. In civilian sector, this is used to provide a simple and low cost 
communication solution. Intercommunication is key in military applications where UAS form a 
network for strategical attacks. UAS intercommunication is complex and can prove to be disaster 
if not handled properly. To ensure that there is a proper synchronization between all the UAS 
present in the intercommunication network, various protocols are used in UAS 
intercommunication. A few salient features for intercommunication are discussed in the 
following sections. 
2.3.1. High Altitude Platforms (HAPs) 
The demand for high speed wireless communication is increasing day by day. Setting up a 
broadband connection to deep rural areas has its own complexities. Setting up a mobile high 
altitude platform for internet access would be the cheaper and better in terms of wider connectivity. 
High altitude platforms (HAP) are airships or airplanes which are normally setup in the 
stratosphere. HAP’s help in setting up 3G and Wi-Max. HAP’s usually use a hydrogen balloon, 
Helium Air ships or the Drone [5]. 
HAP’s establish a connection with the satellite as well as the ground base stations as a 
backup. HAP uses resource allocation techniques which helps maximize bandwidth. HAP also has 
a power advantage over satellite and terrestrial schemes. A tether is used to lift the airship. A PoE 
cable is used from ground to the HAP which provides power supply and Ethernet. At the HAP a 
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multi directional antenna is mounted which receives and sends data packets. Data packets can be 
received and sent from the HAP if there exists a line of sight connectivity between the user and 
the airship. Generally, this kind of setup is used for internet in rural areas where ground connection 
may not seem to be a possibility. 
 A terrestrial HAP satellite system.  
A terrestrial HAP satellite system includes a satellite link as well as a terrestrial system to 
improve the quality of the communication. Information is transferred from fiber networks to 
HAP network. The information from fiber networks is transmitted through a wireless medium to 
the satellite, which in turn is transmitted to the HAP’s [5].  
 An Integrated terrestrial – HAP system 
In this network the HAP’s are connected to the terrestrial networks and satellites are not used 
in this system [5]. 
 A Standalone HAP system 
In this standalone HAP system, HAP uses terrestrial as a backup and satellite as an alternative 
for remote and rural areas. A terrestrial and satellite system are costly. This system can be deployed 
easily and effectively [5] compared to others.  
2.3.2. Flying Ad Hoc Networks(FANET’s)  
Flying Ad Hock Networks are gaining popularity because of their promising technology. 
This is useful for both military and civil airspaces. FANET’s are nothing but a set of group of 
small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles which form of a chain of network. This network has many 
advantages when used in conjuncture with HAP. In FANETS’s traditional omnidirectional 
antennas are used, which are a drawback because of their slow speed of movement.  In FANET 
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moving nodes have highly advanced network topologies. To overcome this drawback FANET’s 
currently switched over to directional antennas. Use of directional antennas in FANET systems 
has a drawback too, that is neighboring nodes or the neighboring UAS cannot be determined 
through the antenna. The neighbor discovery drawback can be overcome by using the HAP in 
conjuncture. Layer 1 which is the ground level would consist the GCS or the ground station, 
Layer 2 would be the small group of UAS circulating and the Level 3 would consist of a HAP. 
The ground station will be linked with a Master UAS which will be the head of the group of 
UAS and all the UAS in turn are connected to the HAP [6]. The three-layered conjecture of the 
FANET is shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: FANET [6]. 
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FANET application works for nodes anywhere between three and twenty. Nodes maintain a 
distance between them to avoid collision. FANET use a protocol called the Location Oriented 
Directional MAC Protocol (LODMAC). Nodes in the FANET use this LODMAC to 
communicate between each other and with the HAP. LODMAC protocol generally consists of 
three antennas and three receivers on a single node. Three receivers present on the node have 
three different functions. First receiver is directed towards the HAP and is responsible getting 
neighboring nodes addresses using the HAP in conjuncture. Second transceiver is used for 
connections establishment. Third receiver responsible for data transfer. HAP and LODMAC 
depend on GPS which broadcasts every second. In the first half of the GPS signal, HAP detailing 
the locations of the all the nodes is broadcasted and in the second half the location of the node is 
shared with the HAP. Once a node receives the signal, they update their neighbor table with the 
nearest nodes location vector. Some other important information broadcasted are the specific 
node id, Antenna orientation and the ID of the node with which it communicates [6]. LODMAC 
is a very open protocol that address the directional hidden terminal and blocking problems. 
LODMAC also ensures that it provides all nodes with exact GPS location of its neighbors. 
2.3.3. Mobile Ad-hoc Wireless Networks (MANET’s) 
Wired Communication poses a great access difficulty for installation in a remote area due to 
factors like inaccessibility, wildlife and a security threat. The best solution to provide simple 
internet accessibility is by using the Mobile Ad-hoc Wireless Networks which do not require 
complicated infrastructure. MANET communication has received a great deal of attention in 
both civilian and military sectors. This technology aims to provide uninterrupted internet access 
anytime and anywhere. MANET aims to facilitate access to internet and reach the world from 
any remote location[7]. 
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MANET is depending mainly on wireless communication and that is the reason for MANET 
network to be prone to security attacks. MANET’s communication is divided into control group 
and cell groups [7]. Control groups are the Mobile Backbone Nodes(MBN) and the cell groups 
are the nodes or the end users situated on the ground in a cluster. Each cell in the cell group is 
connected and managed by an MBN. Secure group communication is established by this 
hierarchical architecture. Each time a new node is added or removed from the group, a new key 
is circulated among all the group members to protect data from potential compromises. The 
traditional key management approaches do not work so well for the MANET because of the 
MANET’s highly dynamic nature. Attacks from not only outside, attacks from with the group are 
also expected in MANET’s. The traditional group key management schemes do not recommend 
a strong security plan for threats that are possible from inside the group. As the network size 
grows in the MANET’s the bandwidth availability and speed reduces, for this reason we use an 
Unmanned Aerial System-Mobile backbone network. The UAV-MBN network have three levels 
UAS, MBN and ground networks. 
 Group Key Management in UAS-MBN 
Group Key Management is layered approach. The lower layer is called cell group which has 
a ground MANET node and Individual nodes. The upper layer is called the control group which 
has an MBN node. Cell group has same broadcast range.  Control group MBN is responsible for 
key management and point-to-point wireless communication among themselves in the cell group. 
Cell group shares a group key which is generated and distributed by the control group manager. 
Group key management within a cell group is performed by the MBN node. Control group 
manager nothing but the MBN node [7]. This MBN node’s also carry a control group key among 
themselves. Control group key is managed among themselves in an alternating fashion by all 
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MBN nodes that are in the control group manager family. MBN node is also responsible for 
relaying data from within the cell group to another cell group.   
The cell group uses the One Way Function Tree(OFT) and the control group uses the Tree-
based Group Diffie-Hellman(TGDH) [7]. Cell groups are designed in a fashion that they are free 
to choose which ever key management scheme depending on the communication environment 
they are in. Dynamics in one cell group do not overlap with that of the other cell group because 
each cell group is independent of using different key management schemes. A new node can join 
the cell group by using the public key certificate. To validate the certificate each node needs to 
maintain a public key infrastructure(PKI). Regular nodes are not that efficient is handling the 
PKI as they are low on resources. This PKI would be an overload for a node and a time-
consuming activity. Use of Implicitly Certified Public Keys(ICPK) works simpler and better for 
the nodes [7]. ICPK was proposed by Gunther as a variation for ElGamal Signature Scheme. The 
theatre and ground nodes key exchange scheme is established using the ICPK [7].  
 Group Key Agreement for UAS-MBN 
Tree keys are used for the group key agreement. The whole model works on a broadcast 
model. Group key management works on the hierarchical ternary tree [8]. Maximum degree of a 
tree is three. The top most node is the root and the bottom most nodes are called the leaves. A 
node can be a parent for two leaves or an independent node. Each leaf node corresponds to one 
group member. The depth of a balanced ternary tree depends on the number of group members in 
the tree. Group key agreement can be divided into member node, key node and a root node. 
Every cell in the tree becomes a member node including the MBN node. Initially group member 
is taken in as a leaf node. When the leaf nodes make a two-party or a tripartite key agreement 
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scheme with their neighboring member node a key node is generated. The final node at the top of 
the tree is represented as the root node [8].   
2.3.4. Unmanned Aerial System-Collaboration Wireless Network(UAS-CWN) 
Drones can be used in many hostile environments where a ground vehicle or a piloted air 
craft would not be able to reach. Advancements in technology and motors has resulted in better 
and faster unmanned aerial vehicles. In the coming years mass production of small sized drones 
is going to increase beyond measure. The current infrastructure to facilitate all the flying drones 
in reasonable and healthy communication environment stands as a question. Satellite uplink 
bandwidth would limit the communication of drones with the base station. Drones are coming up 
with a method to store data collected during flight and not to transmit it to the base station as and 
when. Instead they can store the data and upon reaching the ground station all the data can be 
retrieved. This type of procedure has security threats of its own, like loss of a UAS before 
reaching its destination. The goal of UAS-CWS is that it uses mesh topology. This topology 
ensures that there is no loss of data. In UAS-CWN every drone is considered a node [9].  
 In UAS-CWN every drone acts as a node. When a piece of information is 
broadcasted, that information is split into pieces using an algorithm called Information Dispersal 
Algorithm(IDA) [9]. These pieces of information are distributed to their nearest neighbors. Each 
node in CWN not only gathers information from the nearest node but also breaks down its own 
data into smaller fragments. The information becomes more complex if it is being split into many 
smaller fragments. Complexity increases the demand for security is higher. All the information 
that is being split and transported can be easily reconstructed back at the base station using a data 
decoder. Working of UAS-CWN is represented diagrammatically in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: UAS-CWN using Information Dispersal Algorithm [9] 
One-way Hash keychain is used when the information is collected by the drone. One-way 
hash ensures that no two slices of data have the same hash value. A public key and a private key 
are generated before the mission starts. These public and private keys are dedicated to that UAS 
alone. The public key for that drone is broadcasted to all the drones in the collaboration network. 
As soon as the data is received the drone applies the encryption to the data using its symmetric 
encryption algorithm. IDA is then applied to split the data. Before sending the data to its nearby 
UAS the data packet is signed to ensure safety [9].   
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CHAPTER 3: SECURITY IN UAS NAVIGATION  
Importance for UAS has grown rapidly in the recent years. The usage of UAS not only for 
military purposes but also for civilian purposes has increased. Though UAS has made progress in 
the field of security in military services, civilian UAS have a long way to catch up.  Providing 
security for commercial and civilian UAS is complicated because of the weak cryptography. UAS 
also depends on human maneuverability through weak communication links. UAS needs 
directional instructions to maneuver to a desired destination safely and accurately. Secure UAS 
navigation plays a vital role in achieving this goal. However, major weaknesses of a UAS such as 
small size, weight, weak computational power and high cost of implementing cryptographic 
solutions into the UAS result in a weak and insecure UAS navigation. Weak UAS can be attacked 
with minimal equipment and in a minimum time. The major motivations behind UAS is to hijack 
a current fully functional UAS rather than building a new working drone which takes time and 
money.  
 Global Positioning System (GPS). 
 Present day navigation infrastructure is rapidly becoming dependent on GPS technology. 
GPS plays a major role in civil purposes. GPS is also used in cell phone towers for precision and 
power grids to find out power line faults. Among the most critical users of GPS are paramedics 
and rescue teams. Relying on GPS helps get enhanced position and navigation accuracy [10]. The 
high dependency on GPS, for critical applications can leave humans vulnerable to security attacks. 
Drawback of GPS technology is that it derives its positioning solutions from low-power satellite 
signals, and these signals are most vulnerable to jamming. Military uses security solutions against 
jamming and have high end encryption standards to protect their GPS devices. Commercial GPS 
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devices do not implement the same security solutions for daily usage as they are too expensive and 
impractical. 
GPS based navigation in military UAS is made safe by network level security measures 
and strong encryption standards. Civil GPS is considered to be vulnerable because of its weak 
signal strength [11]. There are solutions for making the GPS signal dependable by integrating the 
GPS receiver with inertial devices. These solutions help resist simple attacks but not prevent 
attackers who are meticulous and ambitious to spend enough resources to fulfill their tasks[12]. 
3.1.1. Security in GPS 
One important factor of calculating GPS accuracies is to consider timing and 
synchronization of the GPS. However, if GPS accuracies are quickly restored, impact can be 
reduced but in the case of long outages, the risk could be potentially dangerous. One other way 
to avoid risks is by avoiding over-reliance on GPS devices. It is always important to have a 
backup system or procedure for many GPS applications. Organizations like JAMFEST offer free 
assistance in evaluating vulnerabilities of civilian GPS [10]. 
 Jamming  
Jamming is achieved by sending signals in the same frequency but with higher power to jam 
signals. This forces the receiver to lose track of the GPS signals and opportunity to get spoofed is 
created. Jamming concentrates on blocking the signal. Building jammers are least cost effective 
and less time consuming.  
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 Meaconing 
The most important attack in civil GPS applications is called meaconing. Meaconing captures 
actual GPS transmissions and retransmits them after a short delay. This is an intermediate level 
attacks and not expensive to build 
Table 2. The types of GPS attacks and its risks [10] 
S.No. Types of Attacks Attacks 
1 Unintentional 
Interference 
Radio frequency interference, ionospheric 
interference and interference relating to spectrum 
congestion. 
2 Intentional Jamming, Spoofing and release of counterfeit 
signals 
3 Human Factors User equipment limitations, lack of training, over 
dependence on technology. 
  .  
 Spoofing 
Main motto of Spoofing is to capture Position, velocity and Time (PVT) of the UAS. Spoofing 
has potentially proven to take over the UAS by aligning original GPS with counterfeit and taking 
control of the UAS. Unlike Jamming, spoofing not only blocks the GPS signals but also take over. 
Spoofing concentrates on disrupting the integrity of the navigation solution. Spoofing requires 
multiple antennas and its costly to set up. Three types of novel attacks are discussed below. 
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 GPS data level attacks  
To produce good, bad or wrong data at higher levels like navigation message in real time. 
Spoofers are not capable of carrying out this attack. Vulnerabilities at this level exist due to the 
processing of navigation messages.  
1) Middle of the earth attack(MEA): In this attack, attacker transmits bogus data to the 
receiver that the satellite’s orbit is zero. Most of the receivers rejected the data except 
some. The receiver tries resolve the error by rebooting but could not and it enters an 
infinite reboot cycle. The receiver only recovers after manual reset of the full hardware 
[13]. 
2) Vulnerable Week Number (VWN): Date calculations in GPS consist of 10-bit week and 
9-bit time of the week filed. Data can be altered into one past week and the ephemeris 
expires. At that time of the week can be manipulated [13].  
3) Date De-Synchronization Attack(DDA): As Storage contains only 10 bits’ possibility of 
roll over occurs every 19.7 years. When the internal clock counter reaches the maximum, 
it starts to decrement. This is due to the roll over event. Increasing the week rollover 
events increases the severity of the attacks [13].  
4) Possible security Solution: During the attack the receiver goes into a reboot loop. If the 
receiver could be programmed to clear the cache this attack could have been avoided. 
Alterations to GPS week number are due to usage of cheap internal clocks [13].  
3.1.2. GPS Spoofing 
GPS plays a major role in our day to day lives. Though GPS plays such an important role in 
our lives, it has many security risks and threats. Its vulnerability to threats is mainly due to its 
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free availability. GPS signals are transparent and very predictable. Due to this weak nature of its 
signals, usage of GPS is very risky in UAS navigation. GPS also plays an important role that 
establishes real time positional awareness. Replacing GPS would be a very hideous and 
expensive task.  
Spoofing a GPS single can be done using a spoofer. Making a spoofer is not in the range 
of an average person but depending on the motives, a person can use advancements in 
technology and signal simulators. A little effort and some financial funding are enough to make a 
spoofer capable of spoofing a moderate UAS. There are again many types of spoofer than can 
just jam a signal to inject a malicious signal to the transmission. Depending on the severity of the 
hack the price for developing a spoofer increases. Using a spoofer, counterfeit GPS signals can 
be injected which makes the GPS signal look like normal GPS signals. To identify is GPS has 
been hijacked, there are simple devices that can track detect if the UAS is being GPS spoofed.  
 Distance Measurement Equipment (DME) 
This equipment measures the distance between the transponder and the UAS. This is a 
radar based technology used to calculate the propagation. When the UAS is travelling to a 
greater distance than specified in the route plan, DME records the propagation and alerts the 
controller accordingly. Some of the shortcomings of DME are that it is very costly and fails to 
detect the UAS if the size of the UAS is small.  
 Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) 
IMU is an electronic device that measure the velocity, angle, acceleration and attitude of 
a UAS. IMU’s are installed in manned aircrafts and in UAS to detect and identify the situation 
and position of the aircraft or a UAS. An IMU consists of an accelerometer, gyroscope and a 
magnetometer. Recent advancements in IMU are its integration along with GPS. GPS inputs are 
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combined with IMU measurements to verify the correctness of the readings. IMU detects a 
sudden change in UAS maneuvers, velocity and direction. If the direction is unintended, 
immediately the operator is notified through a safe communication channel about a possible 
spoof attack. IMU also helps a UAS to maneuver safely in tunnels and buildings where there is a 
loss of GPS signal. Shortcoming of the IMU is that it will not be able to detect minor changes in 
angle or velocity. A slight degree of angle shift in flight over a long period can get unnoticed. 
This degree of small tilt for a long period can completely alter the route of the UAS and lead to a 
different destination which can lead to the UAS hijack. To avoid this kind of spoofing, IMU 
measurements are cross verified with GPS readings in a GPS-IMU integrated device. 
 Dead reckoning  
Dead reckoning is a process of identifying your own position periodically in regular intervals 
of time. If in case of a spoof attack, by the method of dead reckoning we can identify if the UAS 
has travelled in a wrong path or if the direction of the UAS has changes abruptly. The 
shortcoming of dead reckoning is that the time interval needs to be in proportion with the amount 
of distance travelled. If the time interval is too less, dead reckoning may not identify a change in 
the UAS route plan.  
 Jamming to Noise Sensing Defense 
A microcontroller made to sense the power band can installed near the front end of the GPS 
receiver. This microcontroller compares the total received power on the band of threat 
possibility. This operation is simple and very cheap compared to other mechanisms. The 
shortcoming of this set up is that it cannot detect any signals that are coming at a greater power 
than its counterparts [14].  
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 Spread Spectrum Security Codes 
High rate security codes used for communication are called spread spectrum security codes. 
Generally, these codes are spread with a frequency that result in a spread, which in turn increase 
the bandwidth. This technique is used to increase the security of communication so that 
communication signals are not prone to jamming and distortion.  
3.1.3. GPS and INS sensor fusion  
Motion status of a UAS can be obtained using Inertial Navigation System(INS) and Inertial 
Measurement Units (IMU). The IMU and INS provide acceleration and velocity information of 
the UAS Microelectromechanical systems (MEMS)helped in designing more compact and low 
power consuming sensors [15]. These sensors are now being used in IMU’s and INS. As it is a 
known fact that low cost sensors decrease the quality of the IMU’s and INS, software updates, 
data processing and feedback looping were introduced to obtain better accuracies. Acceleration 
components in an IMU are measured by the accelerometer. The accelerometer is fixed on a 
rotation table. The calibration device attached to IMU can rotate into 37 different positions 
starting from 0 degree to 180 degrees.  
Performance of a UAS depends on multiple and numerous small on board sensors. Small 
UAS need a simple and least expensive solution as the inertial sensors are expensive. The 
GPS/INS sensor fusion overcomes these constraints [16].Inertial sensors suffer from providing a 
solution to the drift in the UAS navigations. Any air navigation with an air drift of 1°/hr. is very 
expensive [16]. A typical GPS/INS sensor consists of 1-axis gyroscope, one 3-axis 
accelerometer, one GPS receiver and a digital signal processor [16].Gyroscope read outs are 
calculated in complex number systems that are called quaternions. The gyroscope is used to 
calculate the turns made by a UAS in quaternions. Attitude of the UAS when in inertial frame is 
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calculated by the multiplying the quaternion’s and attitude of the UAS in navigation frame is 
calculated by dividing the quaternions at any given time. The accelerometer output’s which are 
the velocity and the position are calculated based on the gravity acceleration vector. Vehicle’s 
position and velocity vector are calculated by using the Strap-Down Inertial Navigation 
algorithm [16].These resulting values are considered as the initial values so that the cycle can be 
repeated till the end of  the navigation mode. 
The performance of the UAS depends a lot on the on-board sensors and systems. Small 
UAS need on board sensors with light weight and small size. One of the system designed for 
small UAS is the Global positioning system/Inertial navigation system (GPS/INS). This system 
has been developed with the use of multiple GPS receivers and sensors which provides better 
results than a single GPS receiver. Low cost precise inertial sensors are used in GPS/INS fusion 
[16]. Low cost GPS/INS sensor is provided with a positon precision of 5m,attitude precision 
within 10°-15°, weight of the whole system is less than 5 kilos and data rate is always greater 
than 19600 bits per second [16]. In case of an aggressive maneuver, there is a probability that 
the GPS sensor might provide wrong location specification. To avoid this error multiple GPS 
sensors are installed in this system.  GPS/INS system consist of a gyroscope, a 3-axis 
accelerometer, GPS receiver with multiple antennas and a digital signal processor (DSP) with 
memory as shown in Figure 8. Below diagram shows the GPS/INS unit.  
The GPS/INS correction algorithm uses the Kalman filtering technique to determine the 
estimation error [16]. Kalman Filter is an algorithm that uses a series of measurements that 
calculated over time containing values and inaccuracies. Kalman filter is a linear quadratic 
expression and an algorithm used to calculate a series of measurements and inaccuracies to 
provide an estimate of unknown variables. Kalman filter is used in navigational vehicles such as 
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aircrafts and space shuttles. Kalman filter is good at prediction of navigational behavior of an 
aircraft only in linear expressions and fails in nonlinear. Extended Kalman Filter provides a 
solution for the nonlinear variables but not completely. 
 
Figure 8: Sensors inside a GPS-INS unit. 
. GPS/INS has an extensive use in providing a solution for the complex navigational 
algorithm. The filtering formulation called state-dependent Riccati equation(SDRE) is 
combined with the GPS/INS fusion to provide better results compared to Extended Kalman 
filter [17]. GPS/INS plays a major role in providing a better calculation for complex aerospace 
problems. GPS/INS along with SDRE gives a precise and closer location accuracy for UAS 
[17]. GPS/INS fusion is diagrammatically represented in Figure 9. 
 Traditional Radar system 
A Traditional radar is a system used to detect unknown objects at a distance. This system 
emits radio signals to calculate angle, range and velocity of an object. This system is commonly 
used in ships, aircrafts, weather services etc. Radar stands for Radio detection and ranging. 
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Extensive research was made in the field of radar systems during the second world war. During 
the world war this system was used to detect an un authorized aircraft flying into an 
unauthorized territory. After the world war, radar system was brought into civil aviation. 
 
Figure 9: GPS-INS fusion schematic 
Over the years, a lot of improvements have been made to the radar system to set a safe 
and secure standard. In the aviation industry, radar system is used to calculate the aircraft 
position and speed of an aircraft. Communication between pilot and the control center is 
established using ground-to-air and air-to-ground radio system. At the ATC, the radar ranges 
from 40 to 50 miles whereas the radar fixed on the aircraft ranges approximately 20 miles. 
Though radar plays such an important role in aviation, it has some limitations. Limited range and 
the increased air traffic has pushed the aviation industry to look for more sophisticated and 
simpler options. Installing several radar systems to cope with the high air traffic requirement 
could prove very costly.  
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3.2.1. Security in Radar Systems 
Traditional radar systems can not only be used to track and surveil manned aircrafts but 
also UAS. Traditional radar system is large, costly, outdated and can prove inefficient in many 
ways unless modified as per the UAS requirement. Radar systems used to detect manned 
aircrafts cannot detect UAS because of their small size and quick maneuvers. Radars combined 
with other sensors can help detect UAS.  
Radar systems should be compact and very light weight to be installed in a UAS. By 
reducing power and range, the weight and cost of the radar will be reduced to fit into a UAS. 
UAS are a minimum of ten times smaller in magnitude compared to the manned aircrafts which 
makes it very difficult for an active radar system to detect and identify a UAS. Fusion of radar 
along with camera, infrared sensors, GPS, ADS-B and other surveillance devices makes it easier 
for a UAS to be detected precisely on a radar. Active radar systems are easily prone to discovery 
by an adversary compared to camera or infrared sensors [18]. Disadvantage of infrared sensor is 
that it cannot be detected in severe weather obstructions whereas radar can outperform infrared 
in those same adverse weather conditions. On board sensors and processors help radar system to 
identify moving target and establish a surveillance radius of up to 15Km [18]. On board 
processors help reduce the mega bits of data to convert into kilo bits of data to be transmitted 
without any burden on the UAS. To overcome the jamming threat, narrow bandwidth is used for 
communication instead of wide bandwidth. Capacity of the radar for UAS is 1355 Watts, weight 
175 pounds and altitude of 3Km [18]. 
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Figure 10: Advantages and disadvantages of radar system in UAS [18][19]. 
3.2.2. Radar Fusion with ADS-B 
The radar system was developed during the period of second world war. Radar system 
has seen very few technological advancements from then. In the future scenario where accuracy 
and precision for increasing air traffic, radar system is a step behind. In high air traffic scenarios 
installing more powerful radars can be very costly. In the future, implementation of self-
separation schemes for collision avoidance is tough as radar lacks accurate and precise 
surveillance location of the object. Therefore, for a better and safe future in aviation, Air Traffic 
Management (ATM) plays a very important role in Navigation communication and surveillance. 
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ATM is not just trying to provide a solution for the radar systems but a complete solution for the 
aviation industry by combining different surveillance sensors, radar and GPS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Radar fusion for ADS-B Navigation solution. 
Different sensors give their own readings on the location of the aircraft. The output of one 
sensor alone cannot be fully trusted. There always might be a chance for error. In these cases, 
ATM relies on different sensors verify each other’s outputs to remain on the same technical 
readings. The sensors and the algorithms work together to determine and eradiate position 
estimation errors by cross verifying each other’s outputs. There are two types of data fusion 
called the centralized and the decentralized data fusion. In centralized data fusion, a combination 
of all the sensor measurements are taken into a common calculation than just one sensor 
measurement. The sensor measurements are sent to a central processor in the centralized 
architecture. This centralized mechanism calculates estimate of the current state of the aircraft 
  
30 
 
and reevaluates each sensor output through Kalman filter. In decentralized data fusion, sensors 
operate and perform calculations based on their own algorithms. These reading estimate the 
measurements of the first state of the aircraft and save the results in the memory. The central data 
processing unit receives all the individual measurements from each sensor individually. This 
helps the decentralized mechanism calculate a better accurate state [20].  
 Collision Avoidance 
3.3.1. FLARM 
FLARM is a device used in aircrafts for collision avoidance. This device typically 
consists of a barometer and Internal GPS. After receiving the attitude information from the 
aircraft its broadcasted information is compared with the forecasted information. If the angle of 
elevation of the cliff or the terrain is same as the forecasted terrain, then an alert is issued about 
the possible collision. One drawback of FLARM is the route needs must be pre-planned. If there 
is a deviation in its route plan, FLARM will not be able to identify a terrain as the details of the 
terrain or the cliff are not forecasted. 
3.3.2. Portable Collision Avoidance System(PCAS) and Traffic Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS) 
Portable Collision Avoidance System (PCAS) is a passive version of the Traffic Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS). TCAS interrogate transponders of nearby aircraft and avoids 
collisions. PCAS listens to the nearby transponders and informs the pilot about a possible 
collision. TCAS system sends an interrogation signal which is a broadcast signal. This signal is 
received by the nearby UAS and replies with its position, coordinates, elevation, speed and other 
aircraft attitude information. This information is relayed back to the Air traffic control station 
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(ATC). ATC listens to all the communication and transmits the flight information of the nearby 
aircrafts within 5 miles’ radius of UAS.  
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CHAPTER 4: AUTOMATIC DEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE – 
BROADCAST (ADS-B) 
Automatic Dependent surveillance – Broadcast is an aircraft tracking and broadcast system. 
ADS-B is one of the most promising surveillance technology of the future. ADS-B is a 
surveillance system used for air traffic management and control. ADS-B is going to play a major 
role in the future as approximately two billion passengers would be benefited from 2020. 
Meaning of ADS-B is described in Figure 12. ADS-B was developed to replace the traditional 
radar system. Both Air Traffic Control Center(ATC) and pilot use this technology as it is very 
good at procedures and air to air surveillance. ADS-B broadcasts unencrypted plain text 
messages over the radio approximately one per second. Though this technology is widely being 
used and accepted by many countries around the world, some technological improvements are 
needed. Improvement is required in the fields of data transmission, applications and security. 
Statistical aircraft manufacture data shows that, in 2013 70 to 80 % of the aircrafts have been 
already fitted with ADS-B transponders [21]. 
The main feature of ADS-B is that it will allow the aircraft to broadcast its position, 
velocity and intent to other nearby receivers[22]. ATC and the aircraft can maintain the same 
information detail with the help of ADS-B. ADS-B broadcasts flight information to any listening 
entity. As air traffic is increasing at a demanding rate, the data links that carry the ADS-B 
broadcast information need to increase their bandwidth to accommodate more flight information 
in the broadcast message. The data link needs to be developed for the future needs which can 
focus on developing a secure and dependable data link for transmission. ADS-B also uses GPS 
as its main source, though GPS itself is considered very vulnerable. ADS-B started using an 
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extended squitter which would reduce the passive interrogation where messages would exchange 
too frequently. Squitter can be used for better performance during high data traffic and will 
ensure efficiency. 
 
Figure 12: ADS-B meaning and uses. 
 Birth of ADS-B 
Traditional radars were used to identify an aircraft and communication from ATC to the 
aircraft was made through the Mode -S transponder. Mode S transponder was developed for 
better accuracy of the aircraft position, identification and location. Initially Mode-S transponder 
was used to communicate for interrogation and reply. Recent modifications to Mode-S have 
increased data capacity for extended reply structure for better surveillance. Mode-S not only 
helps in better communication but also helps with good flight awareness. Mode-S includes both 
air to ground and air to air communication. Continuous enhancements to Mode-S were made to 
make it better. Advancements were made to accommodate the geographical location using GPS 
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satellites. That was when ADS-B was developed to provide enhanced communication using GPS 
and other combined flight data to predict the flight path and its continues tracking [23].   ADS-B 
is divided into two sub systems namely ADS-B In and ADS-B out. 
4.1.1. ADS-B Out 
ADS-B Out is the transmitter that transmits positional and directional data of an aircraft. 
ADS-B out has the capability of transmitting aircraft identity number called ICAO. This 
information if sent to the satellites every second which then returns to all the ground stations. 
ADS-B out ensures that the data is being transmitted systematically and periodically. FAA 
mandates all aircraft should have an ADS-B out by the year 2020.  
4.1.2. ADS-B In 
ADS-B In is device which receives and display the nearby flight information that have 
been transmitted by ADS-B Out. Along with useful flight information ADS-B In provide the 
pilot with weather and traffic position. ADS-B In graphically displays the nearby aircrafts to the 
pilot. ADS-B In is currently not being mandated in aircrafts by FAA. In future when ADS-B in is 
equipped with a long range detection, it allows the aircraft to engage in self-separation 
techniques which would play an important along with the sense and avoid techniques [24].  
4.1.3. Traffic Information Services - Broadcast (TIS-B)  
TIS-B is a service that is equipped with both ADS-B In and ADS-B Out for surveillance 
purpose. TIS-B provides positional information about airplanes that are not equipped with ADS-
B. For TIS-B to detect the aircraft that is not equipped with ADS-B, it needs to have a functional 
transponder that is in the radar coverage.  
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4.1.4. Flight Information Service – Broadcast (FIS-B) 
FIS-B is a service that provides astronomical and complex mathematical data of the flight 
through radio station. This service is transmitted on the UAT frequency [25]. 
 ADS-B Applications 
ADS-B is designed in such a manner that it can transmit flight information to the ground 
station. The details broadcasted by ADS-B are flight identification location which include 
latitude, longitude and elevation, velocity and most importantly intent of the flight.  By 
Increasing security and increase of data link capacity, responsibilities like collision avoidance, 
conflict detection and situational awareness can be handed over to ADS-B [22]. By determining 
the velocity and flight maneuvers, operator in the ATC tower will be able to determine if the 
flight is in correct route path or has incurred an unexpected change in route. If a flight has a 
problem with receiving new directions from the ATC through voice, ADS-B can be used to 
convey the new directions without talking directly to the operator at the ATC.  
ADS-B helps determine latitude, longitude and altitude instantaneously to the ATC, 
which help detect conflict and avoid them before they become unavoidable. With the help of 
ADS-B 4D trajectory, information can be determined and transferred from and to autopilot. The 
position of the flight is broadcasted to all nearby hearing devices so that if in case two aircrafts 
overlap on the same flight path, they can negotiate a new plan securely and safely before 
complications. Some of the most critical flight operational information’s are transmitted 
manually, by increasing the data link capacity of ADS-B. Additional features like encryption and 
access protocol can be included if the data link capacity can be increased in the future [22].ADS-
B has also made a significant contribution to NAS by carrying information about nearby flights, 
weather and terrain information.  
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The traditional radar system has low resolution and accuracy. If the airplane is at a longer 
distance the traditional radar system is not accurate in giving the exact distance from the aircraft 
to the ATC. The most important disadvantage of traditional radar systems is that they cannot find 
the height of the aircraft when it is traced at a certain long distance. ADS-B has taken over 
traditional radar system in the recent times. ADS-B also has a range of  about 100-200 miles 
[26].   
 ADS-B Data Capacity  
ADS-B uses two-state modulated signal for a better performing data rate. The limitation 
of the message rate is that it can transmit only once per every second.  The data rate is divided 
into three segments; two segments are for the aircraft message and the other is for ground 
message. The two aircraft messages are called the short message’s consisting of 144 bits and the 
long message consisting of 272 bits. Ground uplink message is used to uplink messages to the 
aircraft from the ground station. The transmission is divided using time frames. The time frames 
are 176 milliseconds for ground segment and ADS-B message consisting of 800 milliseconds. 
These time frames are internally divided into message start opportunities (MSO’s). MSO’s do 
not ensure that a message would be delivered without any collision. That is because the time 
between any two MSO’s is shorter than the length of the message [22].  
The future enhancements would be to increase the data capacity. By increasing the data 
capacity instead of a two-state frequency modulation, a four-state frequency modulation would 
ensure higher bandwidth ranges. Exchange of keys using encryption algorithms, 4D trajectories 
and larger information about flight data would be possible to transmit with increase in 
bandwidth. Randomly operated MSO’s create a message collision which reduce the message 
bandwidth or even the participants who want to transmit. When operated in a time slotted 
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manner the messages have lesser chance of collision which increases the bandwidth. When there 
are not many participants who want to transmit, a single participant can transmit many times to 
use up the additional bandwidth space created with the help of time slots. To transmit a message 
in a time slotted manner the participants listen to other participants. ADS-B messages self-assign 
their time slot. This self-assignment of a time slot helps minimize message collisions. Aviation 
industry has opted to go with two options relating to ADS-B message transmission. First is the 
self- assigned time slot system and second is the ground station slot assigned system. The self-
assigned time slot system works very good in less air traffic conditions. In lesser air traffic 
conditions, the messages collisions are very minimal.  In cases of large air traffic in places like 
cities self-assigned time slot will not work properly as many participants will not be able to find 
an empty time slot. In the second case a ground station would help every participant receives 
equal opportunity to transmit. The main duty of  a ground station is to avoid message collisions 
and ensure free flow of message traffic [22]. 
ADS-B has data rate of 1Mbit/sec and is a pulse position modulation (PPM). The ADS-B 
data blocks are either 56bits or 112 bits[26]. The data links that are suitable for ADS-B are 
1090MHz Extended squitter and Universal Access Transceiver(UAT)[26]. 1090Extended 
Squitter(ES) is a data link which uses 1090MHz frequency. This 1090ES is used communicated 
with other aircrafts as well as the ATC or GCS. ADS-B signals can be integrated with traditional 
Mode S transponder. The data blocks are transmitted using the pulse position modulation(PPM) 
with time slot being one micro second [21]. Mode S transponder has two different types of data 
lengths one is the 56 bit one and the other being the 112 bit. ADS-B choses the 112 bit.  
Figure 13 shows the ADS-B message format. CA bit carries information of the 
transponder, DF carries the type of message being sent, AA field carries the International Civil 
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Aviation Organization(ICAO) code and PI carries the CRC error codes. The ICAO is a unique 
flight identification number. ME 56 carries the actual data that needs to be carried over. It 
contains the flight information, location intent and other important flight related information’s. 
ME 56 also has a security and encryption for secure transmission [21].  
The message format for ADS-B is shown in the below diagram 13. Downlink Format 
(DF) specifies the type of message. Generally, DF is 17 for Ads-B. There is also a message 
subdivision(CA) associated with DF. ICAO contains the address of the aircraft or the aircraft 
identification number. The data frame (DATA) consists the actual ADS-B flight information. 
Type Code(TC) resides in the beginning of the data frame.  TS field specifies that is inside the 
data. Decoding the flight data from the ADS-B is not simple. The latitude and longitude formats 
are not directly present in a readable format.  The positions of the aircraft are reported in 
compact position reporting (CPR) formats. CPR helps reduce the message into a fewer bits and 
maintain the high resolution.  Parity check(PC) is same as a checksum. Parity check uses cyclic 
redundancy to verify the exactness of the received messages. 
 
Figure 13: ADS-B data message capacity. 
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 Security in ADS-B 
ADS-B has turned out to be the most important and reliable option for commercial 
aviation. Though there is a high demand for ADS-B there hasn’t been a worldwide 
implementation of this technology because of the lack of security measures and due to its 
vulnerability.  
4.4.1. Background 
Previously, before ADS-B was introduced Primary surveillance radars (PSR) and 
Secondary surveillance radar(SSR) were used for flight surveillance. PSR was used earlier where 
radar signals were transmitted and reflected from the aircraft to find out its distance and 
positional data. SSR is still in existence where the transponders are fixed to the aircrafts and 
communicate with ATC. PSR is being replaced with SSR integrated with ADS-B because of its 
low deployment cost and better accuracy. Communication with ATC takes place via 
transponders which receive and transmit flight information to ATC. Initially Mode-A and Mode-
C were used as interrogation signals but now Mode-S is being used for ADS-B. We can say that 
ADS-B is an extension of  SSR [26].  
ADS-B operates at two radio frequencies at the physical level, they are the active 
interrogation and active response. The active response is also called normal broadcast. Active 
interrogation operates at 1030 MHz and active response operates at 1090 MHz respectively[26].  
Two types of datalinks used for data transmission are 1090 Extended Squitter (ES) and the 
Universal Access Transceiver(UAT). UAT is used for general aviation whereas 1090ES is used 
for commercial aviation[21]. The ADS-B has two important architectural components; they are 
the ADS-B OUT installed in the aircrafts and the ADS-IN installed in the ATC tower. 
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Figure 14: Working of 1090Es/UAT along with ADS-B 
Both ADS-B OUT and ADS-B IN are used for aircrafts situational awareness. ADS-B 
retrieves its own aircraft information from GPS receivers and broadcasts them out through ADS-
B OUT. ADS-IN is used as the receiver at the ATC or the ground station to receive information 
like flight intent, Id position and other important information[21].ADS-B IN is currently not 
installed in aircrafts as it is in testing phase. If ADS-B IN proves successful, as it would be used 
for flight spacing and separation operations. 
4.4.2. Possible Attacks and Threats on ADS-B 
The major concern with ADS-B is that it does not have any security mechanisms in place. 
Lack of authentications and encryption lead to tampering and unauthorized messages. 
  
41 
 
 Eavesdropping 
Unauthorized listening of conversations between two entities or even a group is called 
eavesdropping.   Lack of encryption and transmission of unsecured broadcast messages leads to 
eavesdropping in ADS-B. Eavesdropping also acts as a basis for other practical attacks. 
Eavesdropping is very difficult to detect and also impossible to avoid without encryption 
[21][26]. 
 Jamming 
Any device that blocks or interferes with communication signals is called a jammer. 
Jammer is the reason for jamming the signals. Lack of Authentication and message signatures 
makes it easier for ADS-B signals to get jammer [26]. Weather it is a single node or multiple 
participants in a field, all are prone to jamming. Receiving and sending of messages would get 
blocked if enemy sends high power signal on the 1090 MHz frequency. Traditional primary 
radars were easily prone to jamming compared to rotating antennas. Jamming always targets the 
receivers and not the transmitters. Targeted attack is called reactive jamming and this attack 
leads to Denial Of Service Attack [21][26].  
 Spoofing  
To replace a reliable communication established between two devices with a false or 
mock signals. Lack of challenge response and lack of encryption lead to spoofing of ADS-B 
signals [26].  
 Replay attack 
A message is purposefully replayed with a fraudulent message or in some cases delaying 
message delivery.  Lack of challenge response in ADS-B leads to relay attacks [26]. 
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 Message Manipulation 
Modification of messages at the physical layer is called Message Manipulation. Attackers 
send high powered signals to change the message data. Bit flipping is a technique of changing 
1’s to 0’ and 0’s to 1’s. Bit flipping attacks are possible for message manipulation. Lack of 
message authentication and privacy in ADS-B leads to message manipulation [21][26]. 
 Message Injection 
Injection of a corrupt message into the air traffic communication system is called 
Message Injection. Message injection takes place because of lack of authentication at the data 
link layer [21]. 
 Message Deletion 
 When messages are deleted from a wireless medium they are called Message deletion. 
There are two types of message deletion techniques, one is the destructive method and the other 
is the constructive method [21]. Destructive method refers to transmitting inverse interference 
signal broadcast which erases the messages. In constructive, Large number of bit errors are 
created which is beyond the CRC correction. In this case message gets dropped as it thinks the 
message is corrupted [21]. 
4.4.3. Security Enhancements and recommendations for ADS-B 
ADS-B is secure in military application as the whole transmission of ADS-B is used on a 
single entity. Where as in the case of civilian aircraft, the usage and population density is wider 
which provides a greater risk compared to military ADS-B. ADS-B device can be configured by 
the user before using it. At the time of using, through ADS-B device personal messages can be 
transmitted which are not related to ATC or ADS-B. This random rouge message can lead to 
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confusion either in the ATC tower or the pilot who is referring to these ADS-B codes. As pilot 
main goal is maximum aircraft safety, prank messages could lead to confusion [26]. 
 
Figure 15: Security threats based on location, position and goal.. 
 Secure Broadcast Authentication 
Secure broadcast authentication works well with ADS-B because ADS-B uses 
unidirectional broadcast. Asymmetric property is preferred in ADS-B rather than symmetric 
because, symmetric performs better in point-to-point communication because both parties trust 
each other. ADS-B is a broadcast and it is very difficult to authenticate. Asymmetric mechanism 
helps ADS-B keep its open nature alive. In asymmetric mechanism, receiver can verify messages 
but cannot randomly generate messages to broadcast. Secure broadcast authentication ensures 
that it is only used when a threat is detected and not each and every time to reduce the stress on 
ADS-B [21]. 
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 Public Key Infrastructure 
Cryptographic methods are a success in the wireless communication networks. Therefore, 
cryptographic methods are being tested on ADS-B, but had no success as on date. If ADS-B is 
encrypted, the same keys need to be distributed to all the ADS-B participants. The list of 
participants can be huge depending on the location at which they are trying to cover.  Even if the 
keys are to be distributed in a small location, keys must be distributed to aircrafts and ground 
stations which could be time taking. Other most important backdrop is that keys need to be 
updated frequently which will increase the complexity and reduce the message traffic. Apart 
from ADS-B there are other data links that help establish communication between pilot and 
ATC, one of commonly used one is controller-pilot data link(CPDL). Key management can be 
done using CPDL and support symmetric cipher which work well with non-standard block sizes 
like ADS-B data link which uses 112 bit messages. The secure communication of CPDL is still a 
challenge and if in case the CPDL is blocked, there is no alternative for a safe method of sharing 
keys. Key management can put an additional load on the capacity of the datalink, as there is 
already heavy traffic through the 1090MHz frequency. Looking at the problems of key 
management and key sharing, PKI is a better option. One of the other solution is, use of 
authenticator ground station which has a challenge- response problem. The authenticator GCS 
needs to maintain a database of all globally used security keys, which is practically a very 
difficult and risky task.  Elliptical curve cipher on ADS-B and UAT could prove beneficial. Key 
sizes and bandwidth are taken into consider for this proposed solution. Although UAT can 
transmit loner messages than the 1090ES, its message format needs to be changed for this cipher 
implementation. If the same implementation is applied on 1090ES, MODE S standard would 
require 5 more messages to get the signature data and the time stamps accommodated. 1090ES is 
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already crowded and with this solution implemented, there is every chance that the 1090ES 
could get too crowded. FAA once recommended the use of centralized key distribution, where 
FAA would manage the role of Certificate Authority(CA). Playing the role of CA is not easy. 
Even if the FAA would manage to get the CA working, there would be a problem of 
communication from aircraft to authorities and communication between one another. 
Short and long term ADS-B transmission equipped with lightweight PKI, is a quick 
solution for the above-mentioned problem. Light weight PKI can be adjusted per the bandwidth 
of the broadcast medium. One trusted ADS-B device should be made a secure device for 
verifying certificate Authority(CA) chains using PKI. With the help of one trusted ADS-B device 
random message injections can be avoided. A series of ADS-B messages are transmitted to the 
nearby ADS-B devices so that they can verify the signature. If in case all the messages were not 
received the ADS-B, those messages would be saved for later verification of the signature [26]. 
Looking at all the above security solutions for ADS-B, PKI remains closer to achieving the goal 
when compared to other cryptographic methods. Though the conclusion of the above made 
discussion points out that providing a secure 1090ES for ADS-B communication is challenging. 
Different cryptographic solutions were tried on ADS-B but none of them was successful. 
Table 3 shows different cryptographic methods that have been tried on ADS-B and their result.  
First Step was to distribute same encryption keys, which is a very complicated and a big task. 
The key management problem can be solved by sharing the keys through a secure 
communication link. The communication link that can be used is the controller pilot data link 
communication(CPDCL). For Light weight PKI to get implemented needs to combine many 
messages together for a complete signature. 
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Table 3: Cryptographic methods tested on ADS-B.  
Method Result 
Distribution of same encryption keys. Insecure to Inside and outside attacks. 
Key management Problem Controller Pilot Data Link Communication 
(CPDCL). 
Challenge-Response World wise data base of secure keys is not 
possible. 
Light Weight PKI Combining N messages for signature. 
Centralized Key distribution. FAA as a CA. Many Aviation Authorities Worldwide. 
One Time Key Signature Infeasible 
 
 ADS-C 
A very frequently asked question was, why not replace ADS-B with ADS-C. Although 
ADS-C has connection oriented security procedures in place, drawbacks of ADS-C are as 
follows[21].It has a lack of Aeronautical Telecommunication Network(ATN) and Air Navigation 
System (ANS). ADS-C is cost effective and cannot communicate directly with other aircrafts 
[21].   
  
  
47 
 
CHAPTER 5: ADS-B FOR SMALL UAS 
Small UAS are UAS that weight less than 55 pounds. Small UAS are limited in their 
capabilities. Small UAS always must maintain line of sight and must remain close to the person 
manipulating the flight controls. Person operating the small UAS must be stationary at the 
ground always and should not be situated in a moving vehicle[27].  
 Long range traditional radar systems used to detect regular aircrafts cannot be used in 
case of small UAS because of the comparatively smaller size and lower power of the UAS. 
Therefore, alternative surveillance options such as ADS-B has gained prominence in the recent 
years. A future forecast estimates that ADS-B will play a key role for collision avoidance in 
UAS by the year 2020. ADS-B uses satellite data to calculate important flight information and 
send it to the ground stations. Many collision avoidance algorithms use this data to calculate the 
nearest neighbor flight information which can be used to detect and avoid collision in small 
UAS. ADS-B also transmits additional information such as systematic tracking and weather data 
[28].  
5.1.1. Sense and avoid systems (SAAS)  
As per Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidelines, pilot’s eye sight is still a key 
component of SAAS in sensing and avoiding mid-air collisions. Per FAA statistics, one of the 
major reason for mid-air collisions is pilot’s inability to locate the colliding flight. In recent 
years, SAAS have played a major role in manned aircraft by reducing the burden on pilot to 
manually look out for nearby collision prone flights. Major collision avoidance schemes were 
introduced into manned aircrafts in the year 2005. By 2020, FAA’s NextGEN-Controlled 
airspace aims to provide a solution for both manned aircrafts and UAS to share and fly safely in 
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the National Air Space (NAS). Research to implement SAAS in medium-sized UAS has been 
progressive. In the case of small UAS, research on implementation of SAAS is very minimum. 
In 2005, major advancement in the field of SAAS for manned aircrafts were made with the 
invention of Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). TCAS has made considerable 
progress on how it can be adopted to different sizes of UAS systems. According to Haessig et al. 
[23], the NextGEN-Controlled Airspace is going to implement a more advanced system similar 
to TCAS known as Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), which would provide a 
solution in SAAS for both manned aircraft and UAS.  
All manned aircrafts ranging from small two seater planes to jet planes, should registered 
with the FAA. No plane should fly in the NAS without registration and pilot has meet the FAA 
regulations to fly a plane. UAS has created a challenging task for FAA, Integrating the UAS and 
regular manned aircrafts into the NAS pose risks of their own. FAA has therefore classified UAS 
into five categories based on their weight. At present FAA requires UAS owners to register their 
drone with them. FAA also does not allow autonomous it allows only remotely piloted drones.  
5.1.2. Traffic Collision Avoidance system(TCAS) for UAS. 
TCAS is being used in manned aircrafts for about ten years and has provided successful 
midair collision avoidance solutions. TCAS relies on complex azimuth readings on the aircraft to 
predict the right trajectory and path for an aircraft. The first collision avoidance system was 
developed MIT Lincoln laboratories[23]  called as the Beacon Collision Avoidance 
System(BCAS). BCAS system keep a surveil of the aircraft surroundings. BCAS sends an 
interrogation message to the nearby aircrafts and receives a reply from their transponders. BCAS 
receives the message from the same transponder used to communicate with ATC. Using these 
replies, BCAS calculates the range of the nearby aircraft. TCAS was developed based on the 
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BCAS. TCAS also calculates altitude and range. TCAS are more reliable because it uses accurate 
oscillators to calculate frequency. Measurements in TCAS are made based on the closest point of 
approach(CPA), which is nothing but the time for the nearest aircraft to reach the same altitude 
level. TCAS systems are divided into two divisions called the Traffic advisors(TA) and the 
Resolution advisor(RA). TCAS 1 was implemented only with TA whereas TCAS 2 has both TA 
and RA[29]. Divisions in TCAS are shown in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16: Divisions in TCAS 
TCAS has got its own complexities when it comes to implementation in small UAS. 
Small UAS are very simple and less complex machines. Installation of TCAS in small UAS can 
lead to unforeseen problems. The complex design structure and difficult operational procedures 
can limit the performance of the UAS. UAS has limitations on power supply. On board TCAS on 
small UAS could lead to a faster power outage. TCAS systems are designed for complex 
operations demanded for the large manned aircrafts. Different alert levels are used in TCAS. 
Usage of all these alerts on a small UAS may not be necessary. Performance demands for TCAS 
are at a very high rate. TCAS requires a 2500 ft./min climb rate. Size of TCAS is large and 
cannot be fitted into majority of the small UAS [29]. Though TCAS come in various weight 
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ranges ranging from 1.8 pounds to 15 pounds, weight could be factor considering a small UAS 
weighing a maximum 50 pounds. TCAS requires an effective transponder always. Pilot’s 
response is considered crucial in manned aircrafts as RA’s depend on them. In case of UAS 
timely response is automated and message delivery is at risk. Table 4 lists the drawbacks of 
TCAS in small UAS.  
Table 4: TCAS Drawbacks 
S.No. Drawbacks of TCAS in UAS 
1  Complex design and operational requirements  
2  Undesired communications alerts which choke bandwidth 
3   TCAS Functional and performance demands beyond the capability of small UAS. 
4  Weight, Power and capacity not supported in many UAS. 
5  
 
Dependency of RA’s on manual operation response for efficiency. Automatic 
response would not function in case of a data link failure.  
6  Requirement of an active transponder always.  
 
5.1.3. Airborne Collision Avoidance System(ACAS)  
The new ACAS system is an advancement of the TCAS. ACAS𝑋𝑢 is a model of ACAS 
for UAS. ACAS system are more flexible compared to the TCAS systems. ACAS X is part of  
the new NextGEN-Controlled Airspace[23]. A Markov decision process is designed to calculate 
the rate of collision based on different states of the aircraft. ACAS is programmed using dynamic 
programming. Dynamic programming help calculate the cost of transition in every state of the 
aircraft. Based on the complexity or the transition of the state, the cost for each transition is 
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assigned. Cost of transition depends on the criticality level of resolution needed to avoid a 
collision in that state of the flight. Cost is looked up from the logic table based on combining 
transitions. These costs are calculated using intelligent structuring and calculations. In some 
flight scenarios, the data received from the sensors might be inaccurate. Therefore, by combining 
the probabilistic model and the sensor data the accuracy of the cost assignment can be improved. 
ACAS𝑋𝑢 uses a probabilistic approach for solving the collision avoidance problem in small 
UAS. TCAS supports active radar systems whereas ACAS𝑋𝑢  supports both active radar and 
additional inputs. Additional inputs include ADS-B, electro optical and infrared sensors. Small 
UAS perform differently compared to large manned aircrafts. UAS tend to operate at different 
speeds and change flight course, stop and move dynamically. Therefore, ACAS𝑋𝑢 cannot use the 
same logic table as that of the ACAS for costs. Costs for ACAS𝑋𝑢 are assigned keeping the 
sharp UAS maneuvers in mind [29].  
ACAS𝑋𝑢 is being designed with the different aircraft airspace classifications in mind. All 
the manned aircrafts fly in a controlled airspace in constant range and communication with the 
ATC. The classes that are used by the manned aircrafts are class A through class E. The small 
UAS target the airspace class G, which does not need to be in touch with the ATC or any other 
clearance for flying. Class G extends from 1200ft to 12000ft [29]. Therefore, a collision 
avoidance solution for low altitude airspace depends mainly on secondary sensors like ADS-B. 
ACAS𝑋𝑢 can be increased when data from ADS-B is clubbed with the GPS data for precise 
location accuracy. ADS-B usage for small UAS has some disadvantages. Table 5 lists the 
disadvantages of ADS-B when used in ACAS𝑋𝑢. ACAS𝑋𝑢needs to overcome the below 
mentioned errors to enabled ACAS𝑋𝑢 for UAS operation in class G.  
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Table 5: Backdrops of ADS-B for use in ACAS𝑿𝒖[29] 
S.No. Backdrops of ADS-B for small UAS. 
1  Failure in message data sets. 
2  Duplicate messages. 
3  Bounce in data. 
4  Latency between transmissions. 
5  Maximum horizontal position error. 
6  Navigational errors.  
 
 Implementation and Integration of ADS-B into small UAS 
Small UAS(SUAS) are different in operations, magnitude and maneuvers with respect to 
manned aircrafts. Manned aircrafts have a set of defined rules to obey before flying in the 
National Air Space(NAS) whereas rules and guidelines are yet to be defined for SUAS. List of 
some of the basic differences and observations of SUAS with respect to manned aircrafts. SUAS 
pose a low degree of threat to itself because of its small size. SUAS are considered to pose a 
moderate and not a serious threat to the manned aircrafts because of the magnitude and the size 
of the SUAS. The airspeeds at which SUAS operate are very low compared to manned aircrafts. 
Sudden maneuvers to avoid collision with a large aircraft is not easy because of their low air 
speeds. Due to the low speeds, SUAS stand more chance of getting hit rather than hitting another 
flying object. As per the FAA guidelines for hobbyist and commercial SUAS should always fly 
at the line of sight. Currently SUAS can fly for a short range and lateral distance [24]. Table 6 
lists some of the basic physical observational differences. 
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Table 6: Simple Comparison between SUAS and Manned Aircrafts[30].  
S.No. 
Comparison 
metric 
SUAS Manned Aircrafts 
1  Air Speed 10 to 35 mph. 540 to 580 mph. 
2  Size 350mm to 700mm 
when measured 
diagonally excluding 
propellers. 
Size varies largely on the manufacturer 
and type of aircraft. Average wingspan of 
150 to 211 ft., height 63 ft. and length of 
150 to 240 ft. 
3  Weight 5lbs to 55lbs. Average takeoff weight of a large aircraft 
ranges from 12500 to 175000 lbs. 
4  Range 0.5 to 2.5 km in SUAS. Varies from air craft to aircraft but on an 
average, can fly between 7000 to 15000 
km. 
5  Elevation 500 ft. and above 
ground level. 
36000 ft. and higher. 
6  Day light only 
operations 
Yes. No 
7  Flight time 20 to 25 minutes. Varies on aircraft model and range from 3 
to over 12 hrs. 
 
Collision avoidance with respect to another flying object or stationary object is dependent 
on the maneuverability of the end user who maintains a line of sight. As of today, eyesight plays 
a major role in collision avoidance even when operated through a GCS.  Situation awareness 
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should be maintained with the SUAS through visual observation. Though ADS-B is being used 
in some of the SUAS for navigational and surveillance purposes, it still needs to make progress 
in the field of collision avoidance. ADS-B Out is mandatory for all aircrafts in the NAS before 
2020 but in case of the SUAS it will take a little longer. ADS-B has advantages for SUAS in 
terms of range, accuracy in situational awareness and frequent message transmission rates when 
compared to other existing systems[24]. A lot of focus and research is being put in to find a 
solution for collision avoidance techniques for SUAS, one of the most thought and dependable 
solution in the coming years is the use of ADS-B. For the Next-gen Airspace ADS-B will play a 
major role in situational awareness as well as collision avoidance for SUAS.  
In areas where is high air traffic density, usage of ADS-B Out alone could not be 
sufficient. Addition of ADS-B In improves air traffic management. Generally, in areas where 
there is high air traffic, ground based SAAS is considered as an option. Problem with ground 
based SAAS is that because of the small size of the UAS, it is very difficult to detect. Due to the 
high traffic, many SUAS are prone to collisions. In these high air traffic situations, ADS-B is 
installed at ATC as well as in the SUAS. Though installation of ADS-B at both SUAS and ATC 
help resolve and detect the collisions more precisely, it too has some backdrops. Due to the 
increase in air traffic, use of ADS-B bands increases. When the use of bandwidth increases, the 
overcrowded lines may tend to interrupt important ADS-B messages. To avoid these scenarios, 
better management of bandwidth needs to be put in place.  
ADS-B Out on GCS or the SUAS results in same operation which puts responsibility on 
the manned aircraft to avoid collision with the SUAS. In Figure 17, five types of ADS-B possible 
implementations on SUAS and its working are shown.  
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Figure 17: Possible ADS-B implementations for SUAS. 
5.2.1. Proposed Configuration 1 
In Table 7 diagram of the configuration 1 is shown along with the advantages and 
disadvantages. Configuration 1 includes an ADS-B In/Out, a GCS and a UAS. The GCS and the 
UAS are interconnected while the ADS-B In/Out is connected to the UAS[24].  
5.2.2. Proposed Configuration 2 
In Table 8 the diagram of the configuration 2 is shown along with the advantages and 
disadvantages. Configuration 2 includes an ADS-B In/Out, a GCS and a UAS. The GCS and 
UAS are interconnected while the ADS-B In/OUT is connected to the GCS[24]. 
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Table 7: Implementation, advantages and disadvantages of configuration 1. 
Configuration 1 Advantages on SUAS Disadvantages on SUAS 
 
 Normal Working, just 
like how ADS-B works 
on the manned aircraft. 
 Automatic self-separation 
algorithms will be 
applied by ADS-B to 
avoid collisions. 
 The time delay 
between transmission 
and response or 
latency rate increases. 
 Additional weight and 
size problems. 
 Costly. 
 
Table 8: Implementation, advantages and disadvantages of configuration 2. 
Configuration 2 Advantages Disadvantages 
 
 Size and weight related 
problems have no 
constraint on the GCS. 
 ADS-B messages 
transmission delays from 
UAS to GCS are very 
minimum as ADS-B Out 
communication uses 
telemetric link.  
 Against ADS-B 
implementation 
standards are ADS-
B Out is situated in 
the GCS. 
 Ambiguous range of 
the SUAS may be 
transmitted. 
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Table 9: Implementation, advantages and disadvantages of configuration 3. 
Configuration 3 Advantages Disadvantages 
 
 As ADS-B Out is 
installed on SUAS and 
ADS-B In is installed on 
the GCS, position and 
situational awareness of 
the SUAS can be 
instantaneously be seen 
on the GCS display. 
 Time delay and loss 
of transmission from 
ADS-B out to ADS-
B In and again from 
ADS-B in to GCS 
can result in a late 
self-separation and 
lead to collision. 
 
Table 10: Implementation, advantages and disadvantages of configuration 4. 
Configuration 4 Advantages Disadvantages 
 
 Implementation of ADS-
B in on the GCS helps 
notify the ATC about 
collision course without 
time delay so that ATC 
can communicate with 
the manned pilot about 
probable SUAS 
collision. 
 Chances of collision 
are more because big 
manned aircraft needs 
to take hard 
maneuvers to avoid 
collision with SUAS. 
Diverting SUAS is 
easier than diverting a 
big manned aircraft. 
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5.2.3. Proposed Configuration 3 
In Table 9 the diagram of the configuration 3 is shown along with the advantages and 
disadvantages. Configuration 3 includes an ADS-B In, an ADS-B Out, a GCS and a UAS. The 
GCS is connected to the ADS-B-In and the UAS is connected to the ADS-B-Out. Both GCS and 
the UAS are interconnected[24]. 
5.2.4. Proposed Configuration 4 
In Table 10 the diagram of the configuration 4 is shown along with the advantages and 
disadvantages. Configuration 4 includes an ADS-B In, a GCS and a UAS. The GCS is connected 
to the ADS-B-In. Both GCS and the UAS are interconnected[24]. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
UAS is prone to many security threats. In the field of UAS Navigation and Communication, 
threats are severe to cause serious damage or even life threatening. UAS navigation in the current 
scenario relies on GPS or radar system. ADS-B relies on GPS data, an attack on GPS can prove 
fatal for ADS-B as well. To secure GPS as suggested in table 7, GPS and ADS-B should be 
integrated with other surveillance sensors for better secure navigation. Security in SUAS is very 
difficult to establish because of the size and magnitude constraints. Possible security 
recommendations are given in table 8 for SUAS.   
 UAS security threats and their possible solutions 
Table 11 lists the security threats and possible solutions to overcome them. 
Table 11: Security threats and its possible solutions. 
Security Threat Solutions 
GPS Spoofing Integrated IMU/DME 
GPS-INS integration 
Dead Reckoning 
PCAS – XRX Device-
False Alarm 
FLARM (Currently not yet identified as a 
solution in UAS) 
Terrain Awareness – 
GPWS 
EGPWS with Terrain display and Terrain 
database look ahead protection 
 .   
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 Existing solutions and proposed recommendations  
In Table 12 are the solutions and proposed recommendations. 
Table 12: Problem, proposed solution and future recommendation. 
S.No. Problem Solution Recommendation 
1  FANET’s have poor 
neighbor discovery due 
to use of slow 
directional antenna.  
FANET’s three layered 
approach help identify 
neighbor. Layer 1 has GCS, 
Layer 2 has UAS and Layer 3 
has HAP which keeps track of 
all the UAS in layer 2 and 
transmitting neighbor location 
using LODMAC protocol. 
Loss of HAP would 
result in loss of complete 
location details of all the 
UAS present in layer 2. 
Use of ADS-B to help 
neighbor discovery and 
implementation of SAAS 
as a backup when there is 
a loss of HAP. 
2  SUAS not identified due 
to angle of flight angle 
detections issue when 
being detect using a 
radar antenna. 
Powerful and large antennas 
help recognize and identify 
small UAS. Cost effective. 
Integration of radar 
system with GPS and 
ADS-B provides accurate 
surveillance details in 
locations with high air 
traffic.  
3  UAS collision 
avoidance using 
traditional TCAS.  
ACAS system to be 
implemented for NEXT-gen air 
traffic by 2020.  
Use of Light weight 
ADS-B Out for simple 
and current solution. 
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